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14. ABSTRACT Issued by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff in June 2000, Joint Vision 2020 represents the transformation blueprint of the Department of Defense (DOD). In addition to a predictable focus on service component jointness, DOD transformation relies on a functioning, flexible interagency process in order that the military participates "effectively as one element of a unified national effort." Insofar as the Department of State (State) plays a key role in integrating the diplomatic and military elements of US national power, this shift beyond jointness underscores a clear and compelling need to increase the effectiveness of the DOD-State partnership. DOD and State must overcome three impediments before the required partnership can flourish at the operational level: first, the military's hesitancy to allow itself to be controlled by State; second, State's inability to fully execute its mission as the "quiet, steady voice of diplomacy"; and third, the current trend toward allowing the military to craft foreign policy of its own accord. DOD and State can, however, overcome these impediments through increased interagency liaison, training, and personnel exchange. Without these efforts to build an effective interagency partnership, however, Joint Vision 2020 is imperiled.					
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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, RI**

**Joint Vision 2020's Achilles Heel: Interagency Cooperation between the
Departments of Defense and State**

By

**Ronald N. Light
Colonel, U.S. Army**

**A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction
of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

Signature: _____

18 May 2004

Abstract

Issued by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff in June 2000, Joint Vision 2020 represents the transformation blueprint for the Department of Defense (DOD). In addition to a predictable focus on service component jointness, DOD transformation relies on a functioning, flexible interagency process in order that the military participates “effectively as one element of a unified national effort.” Insofar as the Department of State (State) plays a key role in integrating the diplomatic and military elements of US national power, this shift beyond jointness underscores a clear and compelling need to increase the effectiveness of the DOD-State partnership. DOD and State must overcome three impediments before the required partnership can flourish at the operational level: first, the military’s hesitancy to allow itself to be controlled by State; second, State’s inability to fully execute its mission as the “quiet, steady voice of diplomacy”; and third, the current trend toward allowing the military to craft foreign policy of its own accord. DOD and State can overcome these impediments through increased interagency liaison, training, and personnel exchange. Without these efforts to build an effective interagency partnership, however, Joint Vision 2020 is imperiled.

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Introduction

In June 2000, General Henry H. Shelton issued Joint Vision 2020, to “guide the continuing transformation of America’s Armed Forces.”¹ Predictably, the document established objectives to improve and perfect joint operations within the Department of Defense (DOD), but also recognized that future operations require a capability *beyond* jointness. The military must have “the capability to participate effectively as one element of a unified national effort,” which “brings to bear all the tools of statecraft.”² Moreover, Joint Vision 2020 notes that commanders “must have the ability to evaluate information in its multinational context,” and recognizes that achieving that context depends on “a deep understanding of the cultural, political, military, and economic characteristics of a region.”³

Commanders achieve this understanding through the *interagency process*, which facilitates coordination and “forges the vital link between the military instrument of power and the economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informational entities of the US Government as well as nongovernmental agencies” both domestically and abroad.⁴ On foreign soil, interagency coordination falls largely to US national security and foreign affairs agencies, principally the US Department of State (State) but also the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the US Departments of Commerce and Treasury, among others. Joint Vision 2020 recognizes that the future DOD joint force “must be

¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, (Washington, DC: June 2000), p. 1.

² Ibid, 17.

³ Ibid, 23.

⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-08 (Washington, DC: 9 October 1996), Volume 1, p. v.

proactive in improving communications, planning, interoperability, and liaison” with these and other interagency participants.⁵

Joint doctrine notes that “the degree to which military and civilian components can be integrated and harmonized within an interagency context will bear directly on the efficiency and success of the collective effort.”⁶ Arguably, US interagency cooperation is most complex, and most critical, abroad. Geographic combatant commanders synchronize and integrate military planning and operations in theater, through the US Department of State Ambassador and country team, except in cases such as Foreign Internal Defense, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, and certain other missions, when State assumes the lead.⁷ As such, DOD will maximize its efforts to improve interagency coordination by focusing first on the DOD-State relationship, applying lessons learned and successes to other members of the interagency team. Unless DOD reverses a trend that has reduced DOD-State interface and keeps State at arm’s length, however, efforts to improve interagency coordination will fail, imperiling Joint Vision 2020 and DOD transformation.

A Clear and Compelling Need

Neither the need for effective interagency coordination nor the reasons it is hard to achieve, however, are new. One author cites a Joint Staff memorandum which states

⁵ Joint Vision 2020, p. 24. Two broad aspects of interagency coordination exist: coordination in Washington, DC, and coordination “in the field.” This paper examines the latter aspect of interagency coordination, where, usually, the Ambassador’s authority over other agencies is clearer and more definitive. This is not to suggest, however, that Ambassadors (or other agency representatives, for that matter) are immune from Washington power and political considerations.

⁶ Joint Pub 3-08, p. III-1.

⁷ Despite State’s central role, other agency representatives still operate under a level of constraint from Washington, participating in the interagency process under an “imperative to fulfill [their] mission and protect [their] own authority.” Aside from the White House and the National Security Council, State “is the only executive agency that considers all interests and agencies because of its overall foreign policy mandate.”

‘in the past it has been extremely difficult to achieve coordinated interdepartmental planning’ for two reasons: other agencies of the US government do not understand ‘systematic planning procedures,’ and each agency has its own approach to solving problems. The State Department, for example, values flexibility and its ability to respond to daily changes in a situation more than it values planning... If we are to have interagency coordination... ‘these inhibitions of other governmental agencies must in some way be overcome.’⁸

This memorandum was written in 1961.⁹

Today’s battlefield places a premium on speed, lethality, and precision. Weaponry and technology alone, however, cannot provide these elements. Flexible, effective interagency coordination is vital in conflicts—such as Operation Iraqi Freedom—where the military finds itself in a diverse environment of combat operations, humanitarian assistance, and civilian control all at the same time, in the same place. Effective DOD-State coordination can find a way through this complexity. But the “traditional sequential approach in which... the political guys hand off to the military guys and you ‘let the military guys do it, and as soon as the military thing is over, immediately turn it back to the political guys’ is unlikely to work” —that is, if it ever did.¹⁰

The Doctrinal Imperatives of Interagency Coordination

Joint doctrine clearly recognizes the value of interagency coordination, noting that “in war and operations other than war, combatant commanders and subordinate joint force

Quoted text as suggested by Professor Todd Greentree, <todd.greentree@nwc.navy.mil>, “New version of JMO paper,” [E-mail to Colonel Ronald N. Light <Ronald.light@nwc.navy.mil>] 13 May 2004.

⁸ David Tucker, “The RMA and the Interagency: Knowledge and Speed vs. Ignorance and Sloth?” *Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly*, (Autumn 2000), p. 66. The fundamental role of the military is the planning and use of force to *coerce*, while State’s role is the patient application of diplomacy and negotiation to *influence*. For another view of the same theme, see Todd R. Greentree, “The United States and the Politics of Conflict in the Developing World,” *Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict*, (Langley Air Force Base, Virginia: August 1990), especially pp. 36-41. Among other things, Greentree holds that the “central problem of political management [of the military] needs to be addressed at the operational level.”

⁹ Ibid.

commanders work with US ambassadors, the Department of State, and other agencies to best integrate the military with the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power.”¹¹ Doctrine underscores the military’s reliance on political guidance, stipulating that “wars are fought for political aims. Wars are only successful **when political aims are achieved** and these **aims endure**.”¹² War apart from political aims is seldom final; efforts to secure peace apart from political aims rarely endure.

Moreover, doctrine recognizes that the political aspects of warfare are not solely the purview of ambassadors and State personnel. Military commanders “may spend as much time on regional political and diplomatic efforts as on direct preparation of their forces for combat.”¹³ Finally, in the case of multinational operations, commanders “**should have a responsive and reliable link to appropriate US agencies and political leadership**.”¹⁴ Despite these doctrinal imperatives, three impediments prevent effective military-State coordination: the military’s fear of interagency over-control; the Department of State’s inability to fulfill its role; and the trend toward allowing the military to craft foreign policy.

Civil-Military Relations and the Specter of Interagency Over-Control

In the classic sense, civil-military relations center on the debate regarding civilian control of the armed forces at the national level. Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian

¹⁰ Ibid, 67.

¹¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0 (Washington, DC: 1 February 1995), p. I-4. Joint doctrine writers recognize the importance and difficulty of achieving interagency coordination: 2 entire volumes (Joint Pub 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations) are devoted to the subject.

¹² Ibid, III-23. Emphasis in original.

¹³ Ibid, IV-3. In military operations other than war, doctrine exhorts commanders to “maintain a working relationship with the chiefs of the US diplomatic missions in their area,” and notes that the “military instrument is typically tasked to **support the diplomatic** and work with the **economic** and **informational instruments**,” p. v-1. Emphasis in the original. Later, I assess how well military commanders are prepared as politicians and diplomats.

¹⁴ Ibid, VI-5. Emphasis in the original.

War some 2,400 years ago demonstrates that the civil-military dynamic is anything but new. In the US, events such as the Truman-MacArthur conflict during the Korean War, through Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs, Johnson and Vietnam, and Bush and Gulf War I highlight the perennial issue of civilian control of the military. One author defined this control as “simply the degree to which the military’s civilian masters can enforce their authority on the military services.”¹⁵

In recent years, however, the debate has shifted from civilian control of the military to a military many have come to view as nearly impervious to civilian control. Bacevich attributes this renewed, albeit shifted, debate to events during the Clinton Administration. According to Bacevich, Clinton’s poor relationship with the military lead him to “essentially [make] a deal in which he wouldn’t ask the Pentagon to do anything military leaders didn’t want to do, effectively shifting power to the military leadership.”¹⁶

Whether or not such a “deal” was ever effected, it is antithetical to the ethos of America’s military both then and now. Even the faintest suggestion of an American military coup, such as Charles J. Dunlap’s fictional tale, set in 2012, explored, seems overwrought.¹⁷ Debate over a lack of civilian control over the military is properly viewed as “alarmist” and “strikingly one-sided.”¹⁸ America’s military genuinely fits Huntington’s ideal characterization of “A highly professional officer corps [that] stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state.”¹⁹

¹⁵ Richard D. Hooker, Jr., “Soldiers of the State: Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations,” Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, (Winter 2003-04), 4.

¹⁶ As quoted by Joshua Kurlantzick, “Expanding Mission,” Military Officer, (May 2004), Vol II, Number 5, p. 54.

¹⁷ Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., “The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012,” Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, Winter 1992-93.

¹⁸ Hooker, p. 4.

¹⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 84.

Still, a shift in the power to craft foreign policy seems to have occurred. Combatant commanders have a budget, staff, and other resources dwarfing those of Department of State Ambassadors, and they have addressed foreign policy in the absence of State professionals.²⁰ The shift, however, was “incremental, little noticed, de facto... The military simply filled a vacuum left by an indecisive White House, an atrophied State Department, and a distracted Congress” notes Dana Priest of the *Washington Post*.²¹

Priest’s views offer a segue to a more subtle definition of “civilian control of the military,” one framed in terms of joint doctrine imperatives which direct commanders to seek, receive, and defer to political input. This new form of civil-military control has a duality that might be defined as “the degree to which the Department of State exercises its mandate to advise and counsel the military, considering the military’s willingness to allow it to do so.” In DOD, fear rises from an institutional uncertainty regarding how much control is enough: it is more control than exists today but certainly far less, for example, than existed in the former Soviet Union at the hands of the political commissar. General Norman Schwarzkopf summed up the military’s uneasiness following Gulf War I as follows: “Put a civilian in charge of professional military men and before long he’s no longer satisfied with setting policy but wants to outgeneral the generals.”²²

If we take joint doctrine at face value, the military both values and expects State input. Unspoken, perhaps, is that the military expects input that is clear, and grounded in a basic understanding of the exigencies of the mission. For its part, State expects the military to treat it as a necessary, if not equal partner. What doctrine envisions is a DOD-State

²⁰ Dana Priest, “A Four-Star Foreign Policy? US Commanders Wield Rising Clout, Autonomy.” *Washington Post*, 28 September 2000, p. A01.

²¹ Dana Priest, *The Mission* (New York: W.W Norton & Company 2003), p. 14.

relationship built on shared trust, agency expertise, and a degree of reciprocal understanding that overcomes these institutional and cultural barriers to effective interagency cooperation.

Relationships, effective liaison, and shared goals flow from this ideal. But institutional roles, missions, and biases limit an effective partnership, especially when forums for interactions remain limited or ad hoc. A recent DOD decision to reduce the number of exchange billets between DOD and State by 50% imperils efforts to achieve even a modicum of liaison, partnership, and effective counsel so necessary to bridge the gap between these two institutions, and achieve the level of interagency coordination vital to success in today's complex world.²³

That this "institutional dimension" ideal of civil-military relations has not flourished between DOD and State is a function of a reluctant and even hostile DOD and an unprepared Department of State.²⁴ Distrust has grown between a military focused on the "management of violence" forced to fill policy vacuums left, to use Priest's characterization, by an atrophied Department of State which saw its budget cut by Congress during the 1990s.²⁵ In this environment, it is clear that doctrinal imperatives alone will not effect an ideal type "institutional dimension" of civil-military control needed to effectively join and synchronize the military and diplomatic elements of national power. Concerns over interagency control, however, represent only part of the problem.

²² Lloyd J. Matthews, "The Political-Military Rivalry for Operational Control in US Military Actions: A Soldier's Perspective," Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA. 22 June 1998, p. 19.

²³ Professor Todd Greentree, Department of Strategy and Policy, Naval War College, interview by author, 27 April 2004, Newport, Rhode Island.

²⁴ Greentree suggested this characterization of civil-military control at the interagency level in the cited interview.

²⁵ Huntington, p. 11. Attributed to Harold Lasswell.

The Quiet Steady Voice of Diplomacy?²⁶

A second impediment to effective DOD-State coordination is the condition of the Department of State. By its own admission, State lost its way in the 1990s. While some saw the collapse of the Soviet Union and fall of the Iron Curtain as the beginning of a simpler era and reduced diplomatic effort and presence abroad, instead the world became more complicated. At the same time, State “hired significantly below attrition and reduced temporary and Foreign National employment by 20%. Today, that shortfall of human capital endangers the diplomatic readiness of the United States.”²⁷

It is no wonder, therefore, that Priest’s pronouncement of an “atrophied State Department” rings at least partially true. For, while State is no doubt successful in hundreds of discrete foreign affairs issues, Priest’s characterization underscores a loss of confidence in State’s ability to address major security issues and craft an overall foreign policy vision, the latter a fundamental component of the diplomatic element of national power. Hamstrung by its lack of vision and inattention to these major security issues, for much of the 1990s State’s voice was more quiet than steady.

Present Secretary of State Colin Powell has reportedly done much to reverse this trend. Powell has observed that “The armed forces are... just one part of our national security team. One of the most vital added elements... is the State Department... If we don’t want to see our youngsters have to solve... problems on the battlefield, then we need to fight them out beforehand in diplomatic channels.”²⁸ Powell has sought and received authority to hire an

²⁶ US Department of State, Diplomatic Readiness: The Human Resources Initiative, US Department of State Publication 10977, Bureau of Human Resources. (Washington, DC: August, 2002), p. 5. Attributed to Secretary of State Colin Powell.

²⁷ Ibid. According to Professor Todd Greentree, the entire Foreign Service affairs budget has suffered from a “same decline or worse.”

²⁸ Ibid, 19.

additional 1,158 State employees over a three-year period under his “Diplomatic Readiness Initiative,” bringing State’s ranks to 46,000 people.²⁹ Additional employees have still not solved State’s manpower problems, however: State has had to freeze nearly 700 positions at US embassies and consulates in order to divert 10% of its Foreign Service Officers and Specialists to serve in Baghdad.³⁰

Even this modest increase in personnel, however, has taxed the ability of State’s Foreign Service Institute (FSI), operating at full capacity, to train the new hires.³¹ Further increases in manpower will likely require a commensurate increase or restructuring of FSI. But this is only one aspect of training that State needs to address. State employees receive precious little training during their career; the longest course most employees receive (other than language training) is the so-called A-100 course. One Foreign Service Officer opined that this 8-week course was designed for an earlier age, focusing on etiquette and how to dress, and delving only superficially into how US foreign policy is made and virtually nothing about the DOD-State interface.³² While Secretary Powell has made leadership training mandatory for all State employees, neither this training nor the current A-100 program focus on the political-military aspects of diplomacy argued for by the doctrinal DOD-State relationship. If we want a DOD-State partnership based on mutual understanding

²⁹ Ibid, 3. State sought about \$107 million in FY02, and \$100 million in FY03 in support of its Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI). If DRI helps to produce more effective foreign policy, this modest investment represents a tremendous bargain.

³⁰ Ms. Carmela Conroy, State Department Foreign Service Officer, Naval War College, interview by author, 28 April 2004, Newport, Rhode Island.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid. During Ms. Conroy’s A-100 course, the ages of her fellow classmates ranged from 21 to 54 years old. Their experience base was equally diverse. Following the course Ms. Conroy submitted a critique advocating more coverage of American history overseas; greater treatment of the US Federal Government and agency interoperability issues, and other topics. To this list I would add a primer on State’s role advising the military in the interagency process.

and trust, we cannot suffer a training regime that leaves knowledge of the Nation's armed forces to on the-job-training.³³

Other needs persist as well. The US Embassy in Tashkent is housed in a former disco, the mirror ball still hanging from the ceiling; a double-wide trailer serves as the Embassy in Dushanbe.³⁴ With spending authority that represents .01% of the total US budget, State seems under-funded for the role that joint doctrine envisions for it.³⁵ Still, as one Foreign Service Officer noted, "Amazingly, the US diplomatic corps is generally regarded as the world's best."³⁶ While this may be true, State seems unprepared for the diplomatic role it must play in light of US worldwide leadership. This situation is both frightening and unconscionable for the World's remaining superpower.

Not only is the DOD-State relationship unequal, it is also moribund. Secretary Rumsfeld's decision to slash DOD-State exchange billets has left only a modicum of liaison between the two agencies. In the Pentagon, for example, a mere 11 State officers serve in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and on the Joint Staff.³⁷ Each combatant commander is advised by a State Department political advisor, or POLAD. State has assigned 18 POLADs to serve US and NATO military organizations, but their staffs are small compared to the organizations they advise.³⁸

Despite its small staff, the role of the POLAD has continued to grow in importance. In Bosnia the "value of a senior civilian advisor who could assist the commander in

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ US Department of State, Diplomatic Readiness: The Human Resources Initiative, p. 4.

³⁶ Greentree, interview.

³⁷ US Department of State website, POLAD Program, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. <<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/polad/>> [accessed 4/9/04]. These 11 officers are equivalent to a military O-6, or colonel.

³⁸ Ibid.

analyzing and shaping the political environment was firmly established.”³⁹ The POLAD’s ability to advise the commander on the political sensitivities in the complex realm of 39 participating nations; his ability to build trust at the interagency level; and his national and international diplomatic contacts made him an effective and key member of the IFOR staff.⁴⁰ A service component commander now supporting USPACOM said this about Bosnia and his assigned POLAD:

I am a strong supporter of a POLAD being assigned to deploying forces... I thought we did a great job in Bosnia. [The] POLAD was with us through all the train-up, and the entire deployment. I considered him my right hand man for just about everything—even tactical operations—because of the second and third order political effects of the tactical operation.⁴¹

At US Pacific Command (USPACOM) the State advisor is called the “foreign policy advisor,” or FPA. USPACOM’s FPA, with a staff of 4, has routine access to the combatant commander, and provides input to and reviews USPACOM’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) for the Asia-Pacific region. According to an FPA staff member,

The FPA is a key participant in all Theater Security Cooperation discussions, as well as visits by foreign military and civilian leaders. The FPA sits in on all the office calls and any roundtable discussions. In addition, the FPA travels with the Commander on all overseas trips. We are included and involved in almost every session having the Commander’s interest. In addition, PACOM normally brings on board former ambassadors to serve as pol-mil directors within an exercise control group during Tier I and II [TSC] exercises... [these] positions are invaluable in role-playing embassy and State perspectives on impending military operations.⁴²

³⁹ David A. Lange, “The Role of the Political Advisor in Peacekeeping Operations,” Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, (Spring, 1999), pp. 93-94.

⁴⁰ Ibid, pp.98-100.

⁴¹ LTG James L. Campbell, <Jim.Campbell3@us.army.mil>, “May I get your perspective on Department of State Integration?” [E-mail to Colonel Ronald N. Light <Ronald.light@nwc.navy.mil>] 1 May 2004. LTG Campbell is the Commander, United States Army Pacific, Honolulu, Hawaii.

⁴² LTC Seshagiri Munipalli, <seshagiri.munipalli@navy.mil>, “Request for Assistance re. DOS/PACOM integration” [E-mail to Colonel Ronald N. Light <Ronald.light@nwc.navy.mil>] 5 May 2004. LTC Munipalli is a member of the USPACOM FPA Staff, Honolulu, Hawaii. Despite the proven value and reliance of the POLAD in Bosnia and USPACOM, it is unclear if State sees the POLAD position as career enhancing. LTC Munipalli notes that a former USSOCOM POLAD is now the Ambassador to Papua New Guinea; however, responses from 6 State professionals left the issue unclear in my mind.

Clearly, the POLAD and other State representation serve a vital function. However, few State liaison positions exist below the levels described.⁴³ Accordingly, the majority of military officers, especially those who are likely to serve in command positions, have little interface with State professionals until late in their career. Moreover, while some State professionals attend training at service staff and war colleges, they represent only a small fraction of the student body. Indeed, surprised at seeing five State Department Foreign Service officers among the entire student body at the Naval War College, an Army officer remarked “You guys are like ghosts. I had heard of you but I didn’t think I’d ever see one of you.”⁴⁴

Clearly, the spirit and letter of joint doctrine are better fulfilled if more opportunities existed to cross-train DOD and State professionals. Increased liaison, cross-training, and interaction can break down institutional barriers between DOD and State. As one senior Army commander remarked about the current level of interagency interaction,

As you can imagine, there will also be mistrust between State and Defense—having folks work side-by-side in theater on difficult issues lends itself to building bonds of trust and friendship—plus ownership of the problem together. That should be the goal.⁴⁵

Military Expertise as a Proxy for the Diplomatically Credentialed

The third impediment to effective DOD-State coordination is the military’s lack of training to craft foreign policy. General Wesley K. Clark remarked that the “First thing to know about the military in the policy process [is] we’re not trained for it...We don’t know the

⁴³ Ibid. According to LTC Munipalli, USPACOM’s Air Force Component, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), has a political advisor, but the position is filled by an Air Force lieutenant colonel.

⁴⁴ Ms. Carmela Conroy, as related during her cited interview. Ms. Conroy noted, moreover, that while attendance at the Naval War College was seen as prestigious, slots to other war colleges remained unfilled to

people who participate in it. At some point in our lives, we're jerked into the policy process and suddenly it's there, it's real."⁴⁶ Yet, this is precisely what is happening in an environment where State lacks resources to fully effect military coordination within the context of the interagency process. In the place of ambassadors and other Foreign Service Officers, geographic combatant commanders have undertaken what many believe is a dangerous blurring of engagement and foreign policy creation.⁴⁷ This phenomenon is driven in part, because the combatant commanders have the resources for it. For example, "More people—about 1,100—work at the smallest [combatant commander's] headquarters, the US Southern Command, *than the total assigned to the Americas at the State, Commerce, Treasury, and Agriculture departments, the Pentagon's Joint Staff and the office of the Secretary of Defense.*"⁴⁸ As one Foreign Service Officer notes, "There is no better example of the resource advantage available to combatant commanders than airplanes. Even very high officials at State have to beg and fight the White House and DOD for a US Government airplane—owned by the US Air Force—to make even very important overseas trips."⁴⁹ Many are troubled by this situation, and the clear signal it sends regarding the relative power of State *vis-à-vis* DOD on the world stage.

The age-old notion that "generals once given a mission should have near total discretion in its execution" remains potent and continues to be persuasive in some circles.⁵⁰

her knowledge at the start of the 2003-2004 academic year. The long term effects of missing such education opportunities are obvious.

⁴⁵ E-mail, LTG James L. Campbell.

⁴⁶ Wesley K. Clark, "Civil Military Affairs and US Diplomacy: The Changing Roles of the Regional Commanders-In-Chief (CINCs)," remarks to the *Open Forum*. (Washington, DC: 30 May 2001), p. 3. Downloaded from <<http://www.state.gov/s/p/of/proc/tr/10916.htm>> [9 April 2004].

⁴⁷ See especially Dana Priest's *The Mission*.

⁴⁸ Priest, "A Four-Star Policy? US Commanders Wield Rising Clout, Autonomy," p. 4. Italics added.

⁴⁹ Greentree, e-mail dated 13 May 2004.

⁵⁰ Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime* (New York: The Free Press, 2002), p. 3.

It is the general, not the politician, who knows best how to wage war, or, in the case of geographic combatant commanders, how to effect foreign policy “in the field” apart from guidance from Washington. During the past decade the military’s mission has grown, and where once commanders focused on waging war, they now see their duties encompassing a policy formulation component as well. The Services underwrite a great part of an officer’s training and education for war fighting; little, however, prepares the average officer for making foreign policy.

In the absence of political advice, can the military “self-advise” itself in the manner prescribed by doctrine? Huntington notes “The military man is professionally capable of estimating the fighting strength of another state. But judging its policies is a matter of politics outside his competence.”⁵¹ Writing nearly 50 years later, Cohen echoes the view that the profession of arms is so engrossing that the military professional has neither the time nor the training to master the politics of war.⁵² Others are more direct:

Military officers are ill prepared to contribute to high policy. Normal career patterns do not look towards such a role; rather they are—and should be—designed to prepare officers for the competent command of forces in combat or at least for the performance of the highly complex subsidiary tasks such command requires... [M]ilitary officers should not delude themselves about their capacity to master dissimilar and independently difficult disciplines.⁵³

⁵¹ Huntington, p. 66.

⁵² Cohen, p. 13.

⁵³ John F. Reichert and Steven R. Sturm, “Introductory Essay,” Chapter 8, “The American Military: Professional and Ethical Issues,” in American Defense Policy, edited by John F. Reichert and Steven R. Sturm (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1982), p. 724. While the Goldwater-Nichols Act been partly responsible in spurring training and education to close this gap, the fundamental truth remains that military officers are not trained as politicians. Similar views are expressed by Judith Hicks Stiehm in “Civil-Military Relations in War College Curricula,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol 27, No. 2 (Winter 2001), pp. 273-294. An opposing view which holds that US soldiers are prepared to be diplomats is offered by Tony Cuculo, “Grunt Diplomacy: In the Beginning There Were Only Soldiers,” Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, (Spring 1999), p. 2.

While exceptions may occur in consequence of happy coincidences of formal education, experience, or natural inclination, we should not expect military officers to routinely possess political savvy and prowess.

There is little, if any, data to suggest that the military is eager to bear the mantle of war fighting *and* replacing State presence abroad. Even if DOD believes it can perform both functions, it is not in the Nation's interest to accede diplomacy and foreign policy making to the military. The war in Iraq is telling in this regard. Early planning efforts by the Department of State, called the "Future of Iraq Project," were "ignored by Pentagon planners."⁵⁴ A State Department advisor to the planning effort noted that "The administration's plan today is exactly what they rejected in the fall of 2002 because it wasn't ideologically compatible."⁵⁵ Clearly, effective planning for the post-combat period in Iraq would have resulted in a more unified effort that would have greatly increased the chances of success and reduced the overall costs—political, military, and economic—of the operation. The lesson we must learn is how State's expertise can be brought to bear in a partnership with the military against similar problems that inescapably await the US in the future.

Conclusion

Just as the Services began the process of achieving joint interoperability nearly 20 years ago, DOD must embark on a determined journey to realize greater, effective interagency cooperation and coordination, especially between the military and the Department of State. Joint Vision 2020 and joint doctrine rests on a highly functioning

⁵⁴ Warren P. Strobel, "Missteps forcing Bush to Reverse Policy," Providence Journal, 1 May 2004, p. A7. Strobel's contention that DOD "ignored" State's planning efforts are too strident, as Joint Chiefs of Staff and DOD planners *were* fully involved in State's planning efforts until told to stop participating, according to Todd Greentree, e-mail dated 13 May 2004.

interagency process. DOD transformation is imperiled if this process is ineffective or poorly formed. The time to act to create this process is now... in the midst of DOD transformation, and not after it is complete. Of the soldier and the statesman, Charles de Gaulle wrote:

The soldier often regards the man of politics as unreliable, inconstant, and greedy for the limelight. Bred on imperatives, the military temperament is astonished by the number of pretenses in which the statesman has to indulge... Inversely, the taste for system, the self-assurance and the rigidity which, as the result of prolonged constraint, are inbred in the soldier, seem to the politicians tiresome and unattractive. Everything in the military code which is absolute, peremptory and not to be questioned, is repugnant to those who live in a world of rough and ready solutions, endless intriguing and decisions which may be reversed at a moment's notice.⁵⁶

We may never achieve the ideal, but clearly much more can be done to remove these institutional barriers and bias to achieve a working partnership. Paraphrasing Cohen, interagency relations must be seen as a “dialogue of unequals,” where the strengths and experiences of one agency balance the weaknesses of the other.⁵⁷ This is the secret to effective interagency partnership, and successes to improve the DOD and State partnership can be applied to improve other interagency coordination as well. A flexible, effective DOD-State relationship is the keystone of the interagency process. The military should not fear it; the Department of State should not defer it; and Congress and the President should not fail to fund it.

Recommendations to Improve the DOD-State Interface

At this point it is worth repeating that the ideal of a flexible, effective DOD-State partnership is thoroughly embraced by joint doctrine and fundamental to the success of Joint

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ As quoted by Cohen, pp. 11-12.

⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 12.

Vision 2020. Four avenues exist to improve the DOD-State interface; discussed below in order of increasing complexity and cost.

First, DOD and State can improve interagency understanding and cooperation by tuning and increasing *existing training and exchange programs*. For DOD, this means reinstating the 50% reduction in exchange billets previously cut. DOD should also direct a renewed focus on the political-military aspects of the interagency process in mid-to-senior level officer training curriculum (e.g. the College of Naval Command and Staff and College of Naval Warfare, respectively, at the Naval War College). DOD should aggressively coordinate with State to increase, and then fill, billets in these training regimes, and ensure similar training exchanges for military officers in State training venues such as the Foreign Service Institute. Additionally, for a modest investment of about \$10,000 per year, DOD and State should establish an interagency writing award at each of the service staff and war colleges and the Foreign Service Institute, to encourage research and dialogue on ways to improve the DOD-State interface, level of cooperation and interagency planning. The State Department should consider revamping and lengthening the A-100 course to introduce the concepts of civil-military control; institutional culture and bias among US agencies; and the imperative to achieve a partnership between soldier and statesman in the interagency process. State should also add a specialized short course for Foreign Service Officers assigned to operational political-military billets, such as provincial liaison in Afghanistan.⁵⁸ In this regard, the Foreign Service Institute may require additional resources to expand. Finally, a US Army report argues for the establishment of a “National Interagency Training and Readiness Center,” akin to similar centers run by the Army in California, Louisiana, and

⁵⁸ As suggest by Greentree, e-mail dated 13 May 2004.

Germany.⁵⁹ DOD and State should explore this concept and undertake it if the center is feasible; it certainly appears desirable.

Second, DOD should take the lead to ensure State *representation at operational and selected tactical training exercises*. For example, DOD should fund State participation in Millennium Challenge and other joint and combined exercises such as Cobra Gold, Balikatan, and Yama Sakura, in Thailand, the Philippines, and Japan, respectively. In addition, DOD should ensure proper funding for State's participation in the Services' higher level exercises, such as the Army's Battle Command Training Program, which trains Army Division and Corps commanders. Other training exchanges should also increase, such as sending additional service Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) to State Department training venues, and posting them to embassies, an environment, one Foreign Service Officer noted, which provides a great perspective on both the State Department and the host country.

Third, DOD and State must act cooperatively to *create additional political advisor positions at lower operational and perhaps tactical levels*. A useful starting point is to establish political advisor-like billets at service component command headquarters. These billets would provide earlier opportunities for commanders and staffs to interact with State professionals, and a training venue for junior Foreign Service Officers who aspire to service as a POLAD at the combatant commander level. DOD and State should also consider establishing a political advisor-like billet in each US Army active division headquarters, for the same reasons.⁶⁰ This two- or three-tiered career progression could give rise to a separate career track in State for POLADs; the agency should carefully evaluate if this is desirable.

⁵⁹ Tucker, p. 3.

⁶⁰ In correspondence, both LTC Munipalli of PACOM and LTG Campbell of USARPAC agreed that the Division level is probably the lowest level practical to create a political advisor-like billet. However, State does

At the very least, State should affirm, through a human resource study (as part of its Diplomatic Readiness Initiative, perhaps), that POLADs are not career disadvantaged. The preceding recommendations draw, however, a caveat. DOD and State must agree on explicit position descriptions for these billets, and hold rigidly to them; agree to fill the positions with quality personnel; and commit to using these personnel appropriately. Nothing will kill attempts at improving liaison, understanding, and partnership faster than misusing, or underutilizing, either a military or State officer.

Finally, State must continue to press for increased budget authority. State requested \$27.4 billion in 2004, which funds the US Government's diplomatic engagement and operation of 261 embassies, consulates, and posts in 180 countries around the world; DOD's 2004 budget request was nearly \$380 billion.⁶¹ If DOD is genuinely interested in enjoying the fruits of an effective DOD-State interagency process, DOD must act as State's advocate for greater budget authority. To suggest such an approach to interagency funding levels may appear naïve, but it may be what is required to ensure that State Department expertise is available routinely, and routinely integrated into military planning and operations. Service jointness has provided greater operational speed and lethality; it is not naïve to consider that more effective interagency cooperation, liaison, and partnership can achieve the same thing. Moreover, just as DOD is recapitalizing its infrastructure, so should Congress increase State's budget to recapitalize embassies, consulates, and other infrastructure. The agency charged to represent the President of the United States abroad deserves no less.

place a Foreign Service Officer at the tactical level already, in the so-called Provincial Reconstruction Team, or PRT, comprised of about 100 servicemen.

⁶¹ Office of Management and Budget, "Budget of the US Government, FY 2004: Budget documents," 13 May 2004, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/budget.html>> [13 May 2004].

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